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UK Government policy, credit unions and payday loans 
  
Abstract: This article outlines how successive UK ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĨŝƌƐƚĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂ three 
tier system of credit unions and then posited credit unions as alternatives to payday lenders.    
The three tier framework is used for an analysis of loans offered on credit union websites.  
The findings indicate that while the first two tiers of credit unions now offer loans to people 
who have not saved with them previously, they ĚŽƐŽŝŶǁĂǇƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ? 
original character, rather than in ways that replicate commercial payday loans. 
Keywords: Credit Unions; Financial Co-operatives; Payday loans; Maximum interest rate; 
Not-for-profit organizations. 
 
Introduction 
Cooperatives as associations of people who seek social and economic benefits 
through mutuality, shared ownership and democratic control have been recognised as a 
means through which public administration objectives may be realised (Fenwick and 
McMillan, 2012, p 374; Pathak and Kumar, 2008).  A worldwide form of financial 
cooperative are credit unions that number 57,000, serving 208 million people in 103 
countries across 6 continents and enjoying 8.06% penetration of the financially active 
population (WOCCU 2014, p 1).  Credit unions encourage their members to save regularly, 
promoting thrift and self-help, to allow those members to borrow money subsequently at 
lower rates than normally charged by some other financial institutions, recycling funds 
within a population that shares a common bond and promoting the financial health of that 
community (Edmonds, 2014; 2015, p 4; Ryder, 2002, p 423; Stango, 2012 p 158; Tischer, 
Packman, Montgomerie and Warren, 2015, p 6; Wright, 2013, p 5).  Their promotion of self-
help and thrift makes credit unions compatible with successive UK governments ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ in 
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the current millennium, namely the New Labour governments of 1997-2010 that embodied 
a co-operative strand in their ideology and the 2010-15 Conservative-led coalition that 
sought greater reliance on the third sector as a means of managing austerity (Fenwick & 
McMillan, 2012).  Those governments promoted credit unions as an effective way of 
realising social inclusion by provision of financial services that would break vulnerable 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ dependency on exploitative payday lenders whose high interest rates precipitated 
borrowers falling into ever more serious spirals of debt. 
As providers of financial services, credit unions are often presented as located 
between high street retail banks and commercial payday lenders (Jones, 2008; Mushinski, 
1999; Ralston & Wright 2003; Stango, 2012).  While retail banks charge low-risk consumers 
reasonable rates of interest for loans, commercial payday lenders levy exorbitant rates of 
interest to high-risk consumers excluded by banks.  Credit unions that have interest rate 
levels regulated by government agencies, aim to cater for all members of a community, but 
promote thrift by requiring their members to save before permitting them to take out a loan 
(Lewis, 1982; Stango, 2012).  In the UK, credit unions exist alongside additional financial 
institutions such as the Community Development Financial Initiatives (CDFIs).  CDFIs are not 
subject to the same restrictions as credit unions and so can charge higher interest rates.  
This difference locates their loans between those offered by credit unions and those 
provided by payday lenders (Tischer et al, 2015, pp 25-26). 
There is a danger that government policies that encourage credit unions to offer 
alternative forms of loans that do not require members to save, to compete with payday 
lenders will compromise the principles of promoting thrift and providing reasonably priced 
credit to the community (Brown et al, 2003; Ralston & Wright, 2003; Tischer et al, 2015, pp 
11-15) while creating an imbalance in ĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉand loan book that may be 
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detrimental (Edmonds, 2014, pp 30-31).  Given that credit unions in places such as the UK 
are less developed than those in other countries (McAlevey et al, 2010, p 425; McKillop & 
Wilson 2011, p 85; Sibbald et al 2002, p 403), such interventions could skew credit unions ? 
development in ways that could erode  ?ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŚĞĂůƚŚ ŽĨ  ?ŵĂŶǇ h< ? ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?
(Tishcer et al, 2015, p 13). 
This article ůŽĐĂƚĞƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ within 
a framework that presents credit unions as nascent, in transition or mature (Sibbald et al, 
2002) and assertions about the existence of a two tier system of credit unions in the UK 
(Tischer et al, 2015) to articulate an emergent three tier system.  This framework provides a 
backdrop for considering: (i) whether credit unions in England have responded to the most 
recent rise in the ceiling of interest rates for loans by offering payday-type loans in ways 
that threaten their financial health; and (ii) if the accompanying terms and conditions of 
such loans are compromising the original objectives of credit unions.  A comprehensive 
study of loans offered on ŶŐůŝƐŚ ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ? ǁĞďƐŝƚĞƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚto address 
these questions.  The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows.  First, recent 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?policies affecting both the development and tiers of credit unions and their 
provision of payday-type loans will be outlined.  Second, hitherto literature that discusses 
the viability of credit unions ? payday-type loans will be reviewed to assess the capability of 
credit unions to provide payday-type loans.  The methods of data collection and analysis for 
the research reported below will then be documented before findings from the study are 
discussed.  Finally, the article concludes that while the top two tiers of credit unions now 
offer loans to people without a prior savings history which is one of the qualities of a payday 
loan, the other qualities of the loans offered ĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů
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objectives.  However, this legal change appears to have accentuated the emergence of 
separate tiers of credit unions. 
 
The emergence of credit unions as counters to financial exclusion 
Credit unions across the world have been classified as nascent, in transition or 
mature (McAlevey et al, 2010, p 425; McKillop & Wilson, 2011 p 85; Sibbald et al, 2002, p 
403) ?  tŚĞƌĞ Ă ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐtaxonomy depends on: (i) Whether 
they have developed strong forms of leadership within the credit union movement; (ii) The 
strength and capability of credit union trade associations to co-ŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?
interests and activities effectively; (iii) The levels of professionalization in the form of 
specialist, paid staff employed at individual credit unions; (iv) The amount of legislative 
support that exists for credit unions to change and innovate around the provision of 
services; and (v) The degree of technological advancement that has been achieved by credit 
unions in their provision of services (Sibbald et al, 2002, p 404).  The ensuing discussion of 
the development of credit unions in the UK  will allow their placement in this taxonomy and 
permit an assessment of arguments about the emergence of a tiered system (Tischer et al, 
2015). 
Credit unions in the UK have gone through three broad periods of development.  The 
first lasted from 1979 until 1997.  Although credit unions have been registered in Britain 
since 1964 (Ryder, 2002, p 424), they did not have a separate legal identity and existed 
either as limited companies or as co-operatives.  Credit union trade associations lobbied 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ůĞŐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ  ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŽďe 
asked to lend their money to a financial institution they must have confidence that the 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƐŽƵŶĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?>ĞǁŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?dŚĞ Credit Union Act of 1979 
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gave credit unions that legal identity within a rigid framework that limited a ĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ P
number of members; common bond of eligibility for membership to a specific geographical 
or employment or associational or occupational interest; membership to individuals, 
excluding organizations; types of financial transactions; receipt of sums from  W and reliance 
on  W any one individual; and interest charges on loans to 1%.  While the legislation was 
intended to protect their ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?ZǇĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƉ ? ? ?-5), it restricted  each 
credit union ?s growth (Jones, 2008, p 2151; Lewis, 1982, pp 57-8).  In the UK, the period 
between 1979 and 1997 was one of industrial decline and neo-liberal government when 
changes to benefit entitlements caused poverty for many (Hudson et al, 1994).  Failure by 
high street banks to provide financial services to low income households left many people 
reliant on sub-prime providers who charged exorbitant rates of interest.  Community 
activists, charities concerned with poverty, public sector employees and regional and 
municipal councils responded by helping to develop credit unions, which grew in number, to 
counter social and financial exclusion (Homewood, 1989; Hudson et al, 1994; Jones, 2008; 
Thomas & Balluch, 1994, pp 170-2). 
The next period in the development of credit unions came during the time of the 
1997-2010 Labour governments.  As others (e.g., Fenwick & McMillan, 2012, p 369) have 
reported, these governments sought ways of countering social exclusion.  One initiative at 
the start of this period was the establishment of a Social Exclusion Unit which set up a Policy 
Action Team to investigate financial exclusion.  In its report, Access to Financial Services, the 
WŽůŝĐǇ ĐƚŝŽŶ dĞĂŵ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ (i) bringing credit unions under the 
protection of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) while (ii) lifting some legal restrictions so 
that they could attract a wider range of members and greater assets to (iii) help address 
problems of financial exclusion.  The 2000 Financial Services and Market Act precipitated 
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credit unions being made subject to regulation by the FSA  W and its successors  W and the 
Financial Ombudsman, providing credit union members with the same protection as users 
of other finance providers.  The legislation recognised the small size of many UK credit 
unions and adopted a two tier classification to determine the extent of regulation that 
would be applicable.   ?sĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? ?ƚǇƉĞĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƐŵĂůůĞƌƐĐĂůĞǁŝƚŚ
fewer assets, were subject to lower requirements for reserves and less onerous 
requirements for risk management policies, but they also had greater restrictions in terms 
of the size and length of loans that they could offer.  Growth in membership size and assets 
levels resulted in new restrictions at specified threshold levels ĨŽƌ  ?sĞƌƐŝŽŶ  ? ? ƚǇƉĞĐƌĞĚŝƚ
unions ? ?sĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? ?ƚǇƉĞĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞůĂƌŐĞƌ ?ŚĂĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĂƐƐĞƚƐ and allowed to offer 
loans over a longer term but were subjected to more stringent capital-asset requirements, 
risk management regulations and general governance provisions (PRA, 2015). 
With a stronger form of regulation in place (Ryder, 2003), secondary legislation in 
2001 and a Regulatory Reform Order in 2003 removed other restrictions to promote larger 
credit unions offering a wider range of services (Edmonds, 2014, pp 10-12).  These reduced 
constraints included: greater flexibility in what constituted the common bond and removal 
of the ceiling on membership levels; increases in the maximum repayment period allowed 
for loans; permitting credit unions to borrow money from external sources other than banks 
and credit unions; greater flexibility on disposal of repossessed collateral; permission for 
extra services including foreign currency and bill payment services with charges for those 
services; greater flexibility on dividends including differentiated rates for different types of 
dividends according to the types of accounts held by members; allowing legitimate credit 
unions from overseas to operate in the UK; allowing joint accounts to be held without 
penalty; and alignment of the maximum sum held in a youth account with that which was 
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held in adult accounts.  Subsequent changes included: raising the ceiling on the interest 
charged on loans from 1% to 2% in 2006; further relaxation of the common bond; allowing 
credit unions to admit corporate bodies; and permitting credit unions to offer interest-
bearing accounts and other savings products (HMSO, 2011). 
The changes may have  ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ Ă ƚǁŽ-tier credit union system, in which a few 
credit unions (those meeting the condition for version 2 status) are allowed to undertake 
additional operations that enable them to compete with other providers of financial services 
ŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ?dŝƐĐŚĞƌet al, 2015, p 15) as well as allowing some other credit unions to 
grow through merger and consolidation (Baker, 2008, p 309).  However, their impact on 
people on low incomes is questionable.  In December 2004, HM Treasury published a report 
Promoting Financial Inclusion.  This stated that despite the work of the Policy Action Team, 
 ?ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂƌĞĂƐ  ?ďĂŶŬŝŶŐ ?ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚ
ŵŽŶĞǇĂĚǀŝĐĞ ? ?,DdƌĞĂƐƵƌy, 2004, p 7).  It (HM Treasury, 2004, p 35) noted that:  ?ƌĞĚŝƚ
unions already operate in some areas of high financial exclusion, but the sector needs a 
ůĂƌŐĞƌ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ďĂƐĞ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ŐƌŽǁ ĂŶĚ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ? ?  /Ŷ ĞĂƌůǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ
Government established a Financial Inclusion Taskforce to monitor progress in tackling 
financial exclusion.  The Taskforce had the authority to consider how credit unions might be 
supported to help low income communities.  In October 2005, HM Treasury announced a 
£120 million Financial Inclusion Fund which included a £36 million Growth Fund for credit 
unions and the more expensive third sector CDFIs to help expand lending in low income 
communities and allow borrowers to migrate from sub-prime providers such as payday 
lenders (Jones, 2008).  Consistent with developments elsewhere  (Cairns, Harris and Young, 
2005) of the government only providing funding to third sector bodies that had strong 
management systems, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) approached only 72 
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credit unions that could satisfy pre-defined operating standards to help deliver the Growth 
Fund (Jones, 2008, p 2150).  As the number of Version 2 credit unions had only grown to 19 
by 2012 (Edmonds, 2015, p 7), the Growth Fund may be seen to have promoted a third tier 
ŽĨůĂƌŐĞƌ ?ŵŽƌĞ ?ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ ?Version 1 credit unions separate from the majority.  The 
Growth Fund was supported with further funding up until 2011 (Jones, 2008).  Almost 
160,000 loans with a total value of £70 million were made to low-income customers through 
the Growth Fund (Edmonds, 2014, p 23).  When the Financial Inclusion Taskforce (2010, p 9) 
evaluated the Growth Fund in 2010 ? ŝƚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?  ?most 
credit unions would be unable to continue to provide the service at the price level imposed 
by the 2% per month interest rate ĐĂƉ ?. 
The third period in the development of credit unions came in 2010-2015, during the 
time of the Conservative Party-led government that held office in coalition with the Liberal 
Democrat Party.  While adopting right-wing policies of austerity management found 
elsewhere in Europe (Fenwick and McMillan, 2012, p 377), the government embarked on 
two notable initiatives purported ƚŽƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
to the financially excluded.  Firstly, it funded a credit union Expansion Project which 
provided £38 million to enable credit unions to expand and modernise.  Some of these 
funds were used to commission a credit union trade body, the Association of British Credit 
Unions (ABCUL), to provide a common banking platform for credit unions (ABCUL, 2015; 
Webb, 2013).  Secondly, it increased the ceiling on the cap that credit unions could charge 
as interest on loans from 2% per month (26.8% APR) to 3% per month (42.6% APR).  The 
reasons given in Parliament (Hansard, 2013) for these initiatives were: to increase financial 
inclusion by extending financial services to a million extra people by March 2019; to allow 
consumers to save up to £1 billion in loan interest repayments by March 2019 through the 
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provision of affordable credit, bank and savings accounts; to reducĞĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ? costs so 
they achieve financial sustainability by March 2015; and elimination of the need for the 
Government to provide further funding of credit unions by the end of the decade.  
Significantly, in a period, when the public narrative about the role of credit unions has 
changed to one where their role should be to compete with payday lenders (Tischer et al, 
2015, p 19), the rise in the ceiling of interest rates was reported as necessary to allow credit 
unions to earn sufficient returns on low-value, payday-type loans offered over the short-
term (Peachey, 2013; Uren, 2013). 
The review above suggests that if some credit unions in the UK have succeeded in 
moving to a transition stage (McKillop & Wilson, 2011, p 85), development is not even 
across the criteria that define the stages.  Although the legislative framework may have long 
been symbolic of a transition stage (Sibbald et al, 2002, p 418), government interventions 
appear to have had an uneven effect, being beneficial to some credit unions, less beneficial 
to others and even detrimental to a majority (Tishcer et al, 2015, p 14-15).  Similarly, while 
the recent award of government funds to ABCUL to develop a common banking platform 
suggests credit unions are moving to a degree of technological advancement necessary to 
provide a range of services and trade associations might be co-ordinating ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?
interests and activities more effectively, the ambitions of ABCUL endorses the emergent 
tiered system (Tischer et al, 2015, p 15).  It is also not clear that the levels of 
professionalization in the form of specialist, paid staff employed at individual credit unions 
indicates that all are at a transition stage.  The distinction between Version 1 and Version 2 
credit unions in the regulatory framework and the limited number of credit unions 
approached by the DWP to help deliver the Growth Fund each suggest a limited 
development of professionalization at some credit unions.  Thus, this article goes beyond 
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Tischer et al ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ  ? ? ? acceptance of a two tier system of Version 1 and Version 2 to 
suggest a further divide within Version 1 credit unions between those that have experienced 
a degree of professionalization and those that have not.  Credit unions that fall into this 
third group could be too small to be viable when offering payday-type loans (Tischer et al, 
2015, pp 21-22).  Instead, the permitted rise in the ceiling on interest rates could lead to a 
general increase in the cost of loans offered by credit unions, negating their role as low cost 
finance providers for their members (Tischer et al, 2015, p 15).  Prior empirical evidence 
about the viability of any credit unions providing payday loans and the potential of such 
provisions to change the character of credit unions are now considered. 
 
ƌĞĚŝƚhŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƉĂǇĚĂǇ-type loans 
The pursuit of government policy goals through third sector agencies, particularly 
those that have a history and international allegiances that help define their character raises 
two issues; firstly whether that prevailing character will result in government initiatives 
being unsuccessful; and secondly whether the initiatives will result in the third sector 
agencies transforming into something more aligned to the government policy goals than 
their own original objectives (Cairns et al, 2005).  Both of these issues are salient when 
considering ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌƐŚŝƉ ŽĨ ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ? ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ ƉĂǇĚĂǇ-type loans.  
Payday loans are generally low value, short-term advances against future earnings, 
delivered immediately and secured against a promise to repay within a very short period 
(Stango, 2012, p 151).  They have often been offered by a range of non-traditional providers 
who charge high interest rates to compensate for the risk of default that they perceive 
(Ralston & Wright, 2003, p 305).  There does not appear to be strong evidence that credit 
unions could compete meaningfully with commercial payday in the provision of such loans.  
11 
 
For example, in the USA, government-imposed ceilings on interest charges discourages 
credit unions from offering payday-type loans (Stango, 2012, p 154) even when they are 
mature, stronger and more commonplace because there is an obligation in the USA for 
mainstream retail banks to support them in neighbourhoods where those banks are unable 
to provide services (Tischer et al, 2015, p 6). 
There is, however, a need for UK credit unions to find new sources of income as their 
revenues have been affected adversely in recent times by falling returns on the financial 
instruments in which they invest (Tischer et al, 2015, p 10).  Whether payday-type loans 
provide a viable means for credit unions to expand their revenues is not clear from the UK 
evidence.  A study of an experiment with payday-type loans by London Mutual Credit Union 
(LCMU) when the interest rate ceiling was 2% per month found that while the scheme was 
popular, when first applications for payday-type loans alone are considered, the scheme 
was not viable although provision of subsequent loans to the same borrowers did increase 
their viability through reductions in some administrative costs (Evans and McAteer 2013).  
One of the costs incurred when providing payday-type loans to new borrowers is acquisition 
of independent credit reports which may not be viable for smaller credit unions (McKillop, 
Ward & Wilson, 2010; Tischer et al, 2015, p 24).  Although one possible solution to this 
might be for credit unions to utilize the greater knowledge that they have of people in their 
community (Mushinski, 1999), this possibility is reduced when the common bond for credit 
unions has been relaxed.  Instead, there is a danger that provision of loans to people who 
have yet to prove their financial prudency, could increase the risk of default on loans which 
is already rising (Tischer et al, 2015, p 11).  More generally, such provision could distort the 
balance of the loan book to create a greater reliance on small value repayments and lead to 
ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨ ŝŶĐŽŵĞĂŶĚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚĂĨĨĞĐƚĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞ
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ratios suggested by regulators.  If this happens, the legislation could be seen to have 
precipitated credit unions changing their character to become more like payday lenders in 
ways resonant of other third sector bodies affected by Government interventions (Cairns et 
al, 2005). 
Whether the legal changes have led credit unions in England to offer payday-type 
loans and whether provision of such loans is leading credit unions to change character are 
considered in the empirical study below.  
 
Data collection 
The UK is made up of four countries: England; Scotland; Northern Ireland; and Wales.  
While all four countries ĂƌĞ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ƉĂƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ
Parliament, the last three each have their own devolved administrations (Wiggan 2009, p 
1030) that have taken initiatives to support credit unions in their domain.  For this reason, 
the study focused only on credit unions in England.  These were identified initially through 
an extant, dated list, http://www.creditunions.co.uk/.  The internet search facility, Google, 
was used to establish whether each credit union endured and had a website.  Where a 
website address was identified, the site was visited for an initial overview of its contents.  A 
template of important issues for a full review of credit unions was constructed from the 
items identified in the initial review of websites and the literature to prepare an 
ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŽůĨŽƌĂĨƵůůĞƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞĂĐŚǁĞďƐŝƚĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?dŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŽů 
 W see appendix 1 - included space for simple recording of whether the website indicated the 
credit union offered particular services and additional spaces for qualitative comments 
about the character of those services. 
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After development of the interrogation tool, second visits were made to each 
website between June and December 2014  W i.e., after the raising of the interest rate ceiling 
to 3% per month in April 2014 - when their content was documented.  If no website had 
been found for a credit union at the time of the initial search, a search via Google was made 
again to check whether a website had since been developed.  This proved useful as a further 
five credit union websites were identified.  If no website was found at the time of this 
search, the register of financial institutions held by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)  W a 
successor of the Financial Services Authority  W was checked to see whether the credit union 
endured.  Finally, a third visit was made to websites between February and March 2015 for 
the objectives of ensuring consistency between the classifications of the authors and for 
adding additional notes where necessary.  Our endeavours indicated that 236 credit unions 
existed in England; of these 175 had active websites.  There is a possibility that the number 
of credit unions is undeƌƐƚĂƚĞĚ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ& ?ƐƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌŽĨĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵs 
whether a credit union endures, it does not have a facility to produce a full list of extant 
credit unions.  Enquiries of the Prudential Regulatory Authority confirmed it could not 
provide a list.  Credit Union trade associations such as ABCUL only keep a list of credit 
unions registered with them.  Thus, while our list may not be complete, it is probably the 
most extensive currently available.  Of the 175 credit unions that had websites, there were 
10 where the limited information provided meant it was not worthwhile classifying them for 
the purpose of this study. 
A database of the information from all websites was then constructed.  Key 
strengths of websites as a data source are that they are easily accessible for researchers 
without incursions that would require an invitation.  Paradoxically for a non-incursive 
method, the data collected may be considered naturalistic as the investigator views the 
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available information in a similar format to people who may be looking at the same pages 
for the purpose of making a financial decision.  Moreover, others may check the reliability of 
findings based on such a public resource.  Some may argue that credit union websites are 
marketing devices that embellish details of their financial services.  Such a view denies the 
limits to which credit unions compete with one another because their different common 
bonds lead most to cater for their own distinctive constituency.  For this reason, credit 
unions ?ǁĞďƐŝƚĞƐ are seen here as a depository for information. 
 
Data analysis 
Lee (2012) identifies different ways in which documents  W including electronic 
documents such as webpages  W may be analysed.  Two such methods are simple content 
analysis and ethnographic content analysis.  With simple content analysis, appearance of a 
topic in the text is interpreted as symbolic of the existence of a phenomenon.  That is to say, 
advertisement of a loan would be indicative that a loan existed.  With ethnographic content 
analysis, meaning is sought by locating the information within a setting of other symbols 
that suggest what is intended by the body providing the information.  In this context, 
existence of a loan would be married to other information about the loan and knowledge of 
the qualities of payday loans to interpret whether the ĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?loans were comparable 
to the offerings of commercial payday lenders.  Both simple content analysis and 
ethnographic content analysis are utilised to understand this data. 
In the course of this analysis credit unions that offered loans to new members 
without a savings history were separated from credit unions that were not offering loans to 
such new members and details were recorded of interest charged on loans, the maximum 
length of time for repayment of loans, indicative time before decisions on loans and the 
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expression of principles such as affordability.  The idea of ethnographic content analysis was 
then applied in two stages to address the two issues identified above.  First, the extent to 
which the loans for new members without a savings history with the credit union were 
compared with the conventional idea of payday loans of immediate availability with little 
attention to affordability charged at a high(er) interest rate with repayment set by the next 
payday of within a month, to interpret whether the loans for new members complied with 
the conventional idea of a payday loan.  This provided insights into the extent to which 
changes in regulations led credit unions to offer payday loan-type financial services to 
people whom they had previously excluded.  Second, the provisions for loans for new 
members without a savings history were compared both with provisions relating to loans for 
other members and with provisions at credit unions that did not introduce such loans to 
consider whether any provision of payday-type loans was leading to those credit unions 
violating their preceding principles.  Simple descriptive statistics will be fitted into a 
narrative below to address each of these issues. 
 
ƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƉĂǇĚĂǇ-type loans 
Of the 165 websites analysed in detail, 76  W or 46%  W indicated that the respective 
credit unions offered loans to new members without a savings history while 89 or 54% of 
credit unions did not.  This figure is considerably greater than the nineteen version 2 credit 
unions in existence across the UK (Edmonds, 2015, p 7).  However, it is only marginally 
greater than the 72 credit unions involved in the administration of the Growth Fund (Jones, 
2008, p 2150).  This tends to confirm the earlier suggestion that in addition to the distinction 
between Version 1 and Version 2 credit unions, there is a divide within Version 1.  It appears 
to be only Version 2 and some Version 1 credit unions that are offering loans to new 
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members who have not saved previously, while for the majority of credit union, the costs of 
doing so are prohibitive (McKillop et al, 2010; Tischer et al, 2015).   
To assess whether the loans offered to new members were likely to have a negative 
impact on the financial wellbeing of a credit union, by distorting its loan book (Edwards, 
2014), the loans for new members that did not have a savings history with the credit union 
were compared with the definition of payday loans as of a low value, available immediately, 
charged at a higher interest rate and to be repaid within a month or at the next payday 
(Stango, 2012, p 151).  The ceiling for most of these loans was less than £1,000, suggesting 
that a bias towards smaller value loans may have been introduced.  A significant variation to 
this existed at credit unions that shared a common bond of employment, particularly at 
credit unions associated with the police.  For example, Number 1 Copper Pot Credit Union 
offered loans of up to £7,500 for new members who were probationary officers while Blues 
and Twos Credit Union provided loans of up to £5,000 for new members.  Table 1 shows the 
maximum interest rate, the time taken to provide loans   
 
Insert table 1 about here 
and the length of time permitted for repayment of loans by new members without a savings 
history.  Notably, while 44 or 57.8% of credit unions took advantage of the opportunity to 
raise their interest rates to above the previous ceiling of 2%, a considerable minority of 32 
or 42.8% did not.  When the repayment period is considered, ŶŽĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĞďƉĂŐĞƐ
indicated expectation of the loan being paid back on the next payday.  A large majority 
indicated the loan had to be repaid within a year.  Some others  W particularly those that 
shared a common bond of employment and offered large value loans to new members  W 
allowed longer periods.  For examples, both Number 1 Copper Pot Credit Union and Blues 
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and Twos Credit Union allowed maximum repayment periods of five years for their higher 
value loans to new members.  With the remaining credit unions, 8 or 10.5% provided 
insufficient detail of repayment periods and 2 or 2.6% stated explicitly that payback periods 
were flexible, but encouraged the new members to repay the loans quickly to save on total 
interest payments.    On the question of the length of time taken to make a decision and 
deliver a loan, while there was insufficient detail about 22  W or 28.9%  W of the 76 credit 
unions, no website that provided information suggested that a decision on a loan would be 
made routinely on the day of application.  There was the odd credit union such as LMCU 
that were prepared to process the application on the day at an additional cost to the 
applicant.  Over 35% provided definitive indications of within two weeks while a further 
28.9% suggested that the period would be short without providing a definitive period, with 
statements such as when a credit committee met.  In the remaining 5, or 6.6% of, instances, 
the website indicated that the loan would be made available as soon as the first repayment 
on the loan had been received either through a payroll, benefit or direct debit deduction. 
The greater length of time to make a decision, the diverse value of the loans, the 
variety of interest rates and the longer time given for repayment of loans suggests that 
government initiatives have not led to credit unions offering conventional payday loans.  
However, government policies have led some credit unions to offer low-value, short-term 
loans and the potential detrimental impact of that needs to be considered.  Some loans for 
new members are not short-term, nor of limited value so these may be unlikely to distort 
the existing loan book.  The fact that it appears to be only the larger credit unions that are 
offering loans to new members without prior savings would suggest that they already have 
a larger portfolio of loans to help balance the shorter-term and lower-value quality of some 
of the loans that are now being offered.  Moreover, there are potential positive implications 
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of the liquidity that arises from short-term loans.  As noted previously, in recent years, the 
potential for credit unions to earn returns from some of their previous methods of 
investment has diminished (Tischer et al, 2015, p 10).  Provision of short-term loans does 
not only provide an alternative form of deployment of assets, but the structure of 
repayments means that those assets will be highly liquid allowing some to be converted into 
alternative  W and potentially higher earning  W investments should they become available and 
the credit union considers it necessary or desirable. 
Although the loans do not comply with the conventional idea of traditional payday 
loans, abandonment of the principle for people to have saved previously with the credit 
union does move the loans for new members towards conventional payday loans.  Given 
Tischer et al ?Ɛ (2015) concerns of rising levels of default on credit union loans, waiving of the 
prior requirement to save could have a detrimental impact.  The finding in table 1 that the 
credit unions offering loans to new members tend to take their time to make a decision 
suggests that they are conducting checks to protect against default.  To investigate this issue 
further, the website database was analysed for issues of affordability.  Table 2 provides a 
summary of the ways in which credit unions checked that new members could 
 
Insert table 2 about here 
afford their loan.  Significantly, 45  W or 59.2%  W of credit unions expected new members 
seeking loans to complete an extensive form which included itemised detail of their 
houseŚŽůĚďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ƐŝŶĐŽŵĞĂŶĚŽƵƚŐŽŝŶŐƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞŶƐĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ
with the loan was affordable.  In a further 5 instances  W or 6.6%  W of the total, new members 
had to make an appointment for an interview when extensive detail would be required.  In 
an identical number of instances where no form was available, there was an indication that 
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a significant amount of detail would be required about income and expenditure to apply for 
a loan.  In 8 instances  W or 10.5%  W of the total of 76 credit unions, the form required only 
aggregate, rather than itemised, information of income and expenditure.  The issue of 
affordability evident at a majority appeared to be extended to savings.  There was no 
evidence of credit unions providing loans without requiring members to join and a majority 
also required people to save while repaying their loans.  While not denying the potential for 
default rates to rise at credit unions when they start catering for members without a savings 
history, the evidence from this study is that the extensive checks on affordability operated 
by many credit unions may militate against this becoming overly detrimental. 
 
 
Change as a consequence of taking on new practices 
This section investigates whether the legal changes that allow provision of loans to a 
new constituency has led credit unions to violate their longstanding principles  of promotion 
of thrift and provision of low cost loans to the community (Edmonds, 2014; Tischer et al, 
2015) in ways that would be consistent with Cairns et al ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶthat other third 
sector bodies ?ĂŝŵƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƌĞ-orientated after government initiatives.  As noted above, 
some credit unions that offered loans to new members who had not saved previously, 
expected those members to save while repaying any loan, which suggests that the principle 
of thrift was not abandoned.  Some even indicated clear criteria for saving.  For example, 
Cleator Moor and District Credit Union reported a requirement to save £1 per month for 
every £100 borrowed.  Moreover, 42.8% of those that provided loans to members without 
prior savings did not increase their interest rates above the prior ceiling of 2% indicating low 
cost loans were not being abandoned.  Two ways of assessing whether there was a drift to a 
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change in principles arising from offering loans to people who had not saved previously are 
firstly by exploring whether the principles that underlay the interest charged on the new 
loans are markedly different to the principles that are applied to the existing range of loans 
and secondly by considering whether the principles for these new loans differed from the 
principles underlying loans provided by credit unions that did not offer loans to new 
members without prior savings. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the principle for the variation 
 
Insert table 3 about here 
in interest evident at those credit unions providing loans to new members who had no 
savings history and makes a comparison with the principles apparent at credit unions  W 
shown in the shadowed area  W that did not offer such loans.  47 or 61.8% of the 76 credit 
unions that offered loans to new members who did not have a savings history with them, 
employed a general set of principles to the loans that they offered and the new loans simply 
fitted in with these general principles.  Those principles included variations according to the 
sum borrowed, the ways of paying back the loan such as through payroll deductions and the 
extent of security that the credit union enjoyed in terms of proportion of the loan that was 
covered by the shares held by the member in the credit union.  The degree of sophistication 
of principles in the preceding loan provisions suggests that those credit unions include the 
emergent third tier that benefited from the Growth Fund  and had already realised a degree 
of professionalism indicative of approaching a transition stage in Sibbald et al ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?
taxonomy. 
The comparison with credit unions that did not offer loans to new members 
highlights that the largest difference is that those not offering new loans generally had less 
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sophisticated interest distinctions in their range of loans.    A majority reported a standard 
rate for all loans, or that they simply varied the level of interest according to the scale of the 
loan.  The pattern of ƚŚĞƐĞĐƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ůĞƐƐƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƌĂŶŐĞis consistent with 
the idea that this group constitutes the bottom tier of three and includes the smaller 
Version 1 credit unions that had not reached the professionalization associated with a 
transition stage of development. An alternative way of assessing whether the introduction 
of loans for new members without a savings history was leading those credit unions to 
abandon their original principles is to compare the terms on such loans with the terms at 
credit unions that did not offer such loans.  Table 4 does this with the  
 
Insert table 4 about here 
shadowed area indicating details from the websites of credit unions that had not 
introduced loans for new members without a savings history.  The key differences are that 
around 15% more websites that had introduced loans for new members had introduced the 
ceiling of 3% than credit unions that had not introduced loans for new members.  By 
contrast, 15% more credit unions in the latter group had a maximum interest rate of only 
1% when compared with those that had introduced loans for new members without a 
savings history.  While it might be tempting to interpret the general higher cost of 
borrowing as indicative of these changes leading to abandonment of the principles of 
offering low value loans to the broader community, this argument appears too simplistic, 
especially as a high proportion - 37.1%  W of credit unions that did not offer loans to new 
members without a savings history, had introduced the 3% ceiling.  While this finding 
highlights the danger identified by Tischer et al (2015) of a general rate rise materialising for 
all credit union member, the generality of the pattern across all different tiers of credit 
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unions suggests its cause could be the costs of greater regulation affecting all credit unions.  
When the time to make a decision is considered, the percentage of credit unions that gave a 
definite indicative period of between one day and two weeks were comparable across both 
those credit unions who offered loans to new members without a savings history and those 
who did not.  Significantly, 5.6% of those who did not offer loans to new members reported 
a capacity to make a decision about a loan on the same day of the application. 
  The main variation in indicative lengths of repayment periods between credit unions that 
offered loans to new members without a savings history and those that did not was that 
over 30% more of the former group reported that they anticipated repayment of the loan 
within a year while almost the same total of the latter group indicated that repayment could 
take more than two years.  This pattern tends to suggest that lending smaller sums over a 
short period was one way in which credit unions built up trust in new members without a 
savings history before permitting them larger loans over a longer period.  Such an 
explanation would be consistent with the idea that the top tier of Version 2 credit unions 
and the emergent middle tier  W i.e., those Version 1 credit unions who received government 
monies  W that benefited from the Growth Fund developed degrees of sophistication in their 
techniques of managing loans from people that had previously been financially excluded. 
When the comparability of interest rate charges, the longer time to make a decision 
about a loan by those credit unions providing loans for new members without a savings 
record and the shorter times permitted for repayment are perceived together with the 
expectations around saving once a loan had been granted, it appears that rather than 
diverging from their original principles, the credit unions involved are seeking to extend 
services and ideas about the value of thrift to a new constituency within the community in a 
sensible way. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This article has considered the impact of ŬĞǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇ
on the capability of credit unions to help counter financial exclusion by offering payday-type 
loans and  W if such loans are offered  W whether their provision is having a detrimental effect 
on credit unions.  Central to an understanding of the pattern of evidence found in the study 
of credit union websites conducted to examine these issues is a classification of credit 
unions in the UK.  Building on McKillop and Wilson ?Ɛ (2011) suggestion that UK credit unions 
are generally in a state of transition, having experienced advances in the legislative 
framework, developments in technology and professionalization and Tischer et al ?Ɛ (2015) 
report that the legislative framework has led to the development of a two tier system, this 
article has argued the emergence of a third tier.  The findings from this research also 
suggest that in addition to Version 2 credit unions, two tiers exist within the Version 1 class 
of credit unions.  The bottom tier comprises the 61 credit unions that had not advanced 
sufficiently technologically to have their own website and the remainder of the Version 1 
credit unions that the DWP had not selected to benefit from the Growth Fund while the 
middle tier is made up of the Version 1 beneficiaries of the Growth Fund that had 
experienced a degree of professionalization and offered a sophisticated range of loan 
products into which loans for new members without savings could be fitted easily. 
This three tiers need to be kept in mind when evaluating arguments about the 
development of payday-type loans and concomitant dangers of rising levels of default 
(Tischer et al, 2015) and an imbalanced loan book (Edmonds, 2014).  The evidence offered 
tends to suggest that these arguments may be over-generalized.  Growth  of some credit 
unions and their development of a range of loans coupled with the initial checks on 
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affordability that they exercise, the methods of repayment that they institute and the 
ongoing requirement to save, suggests that they can assimilate a new constituency that 
have not saved with them previously.  This indicates that rather than these credit unions 
changing their character (Brown et al, 2003; Edmonds, 2014) as has been suggested for 
other third sector organizations that receive government support (Cairns et al, 2005), they 
are taking steps to extend their constituency in ways that protect the rest of the community 
in that constituency.  The failure of others to offer loans to new members who have not 
saved previously appears to be because many have experienced only limited 
professionalization which leads them to organize their loan provisions according to simple 
principles and so might not have the wide portfolio of assets that would enable them to do 
so (Edmonds, 2014) or the mechanisms that would enable them to protect against the risk 
of default that might accompany such loans (Tischer et al, 2015).  This pattern suggests that 
the raising of the cap on the ceiling for interest rates to allow provision of low value loans to 
a new constituency has accentuated the movement towards a tiered system rather than 
negating it. 
The failure of some credit unions to cater for the constituency of people who have 
not saved with them previously raises the issue of how those people who are financially 
excluded by banks and dependent on payday lenders may be catered for by credit unions.  
As evidence from the USA (Stango, 2012) indicates, some borrowers prefer using payday 
loan companies because their credit scores are not damaged by late payments which may 
not be the case with credit unions.  However, there may be others who are currently 
excluded, but who might benefit from credit union provisions.  In this regard, Tischer et al ?Ɛ
(2015, p 15) observation that mainstream banks have an obligation in the USA to support 
ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ? ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ŝŶ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ďĂŶŬƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ
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unable to do so suggests that if legislation required banks to provide financial support to 
credit unions and credit unions were to link up with CDFIs, more resources would be 
available to support those who are currently financially excluded.  Moreover, development 
of the common banking platform through ABCUL could provide data for analysis of default 
under different conditions which could permit better control of new accounts amongst 
groups that might be more at risk of defaulting.  Development of such a programme of 
initiatives could provide a model for credit unions in other countries where there is a 
movement from nascent to credit unions in transition. 
A significant finding of this research is that a high proportion of both credit unions 
that offer loans to new members without a savings history and those that do not, have 
increased the ceiling of interest rates on some of their loans to the new maximum of 3%.  
The general nature of the rise across different tiers of credit unions suggests that many may 
have found it difficult to offer loans of low value to their members who require them while 
maintaining some of the expectations of regulators around such financial issues as assets 
and liquidity.  If government policies affecting credit unions are to realise their desired social 
objectives, it is clear that they should be considered in the context of the financial 
regulations that affect bodies such as credit unions in ways that do not affect subprime 
providers such as payday lenders.  Moreover, more support is required to support what has 
been identified as a third tier of credit unions who provide a valuable service in their 
locality, but which appear to have been neglected and disadvantaged by many recent 
government initiatives. 
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Appendix  W Website interrogation tool 
Credit Union: Bristol Credit Union 
 Yes/no Additional detail 
Bond   
Individuals   
Area  W residence   
Area  W work or residence   
Single employer   
Voluntary organization  W 
church 
  
Voluntary organization  W trade 
union 
  
Voluntary organization  W other   
   
Business membership 
permitted 
  
   
   
Product Range   
Current and Savings Accounts   
Current accounts   
Junior accounts   
Savings accounts   
Seasonal savings accounts   
Individual Savings Accounts 
(ISAs) 
  
   
Loans   
Existing member loans   
Existing member top-up loans   
New member loans   
Large loans ( £5,000 +)   
 ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚůŽĂŶƐ   
   
Additional lending products   
Credit Cards   
   
Insurance   
Income protection insurance   
Death protection loan 
insurance 
  
Injury loan insurance   
   
   
Terms   
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Joining fee   
Dividends   
Repayment frequency   
Minimum repayments   
Flexible repayments   
Rates of interest   
Differentiated rates of interest 
according to product 
  
Requirement to save   
    
   
Details about administration   
Length of time between 
application and loan 
  
Employee payroll facility 
availability 
  
   
   
Advice   
Advice on application   
Type of information required 
to make application 
  
Details of Credit Union using 
credit reference agency 
  
Internal calculator   
   
Other advice   
Details of helpful external 
agencies 
  
   
   
Marketing   
Price comparisons with 
payday loans 
  
Details about evils of loan 
sharks 
  
   
   
Types of accessibility   
Details of offices   
Details of collection points   
Details of times of openings/ 
availability 
  
Website accessibility   
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General money management 
advice 
  
   
   
Extra benefits for members   
   
   
Philanthropy   
Credit union hardship fund   
ƌĞĚŝƚƵŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌĚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ   
Requests to support credit 
unions debt advice facility 
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Table 1 
Table 1: Features of loans offered to members without a savings history. 
Maximum interest rates 
Rate p.m. 3% 2.75% 2.5% 1.51-2% 1.01-
1.5% 
1% Under 
1% 
Number 40 3 1 23 5 4 0 
% of 76 52.6% 3.9% 1.3% 30.3% 6.6% 5.3% 0% 
Time to make a decision  
Length Same 
day 
1-3 
working 
days 
Week Two 
weeks 
Not 
clear but 
short 
Linked to 
first 
repayment 
No 
detail 
Number 0 8 10 9 22 5 22 
% of 76 0% 10.5% 13.2% 11.8% 28.9% 6.6% 28.9% 
Indicative maximum length of repayment period 
Length Next 
payday 
One-six 
months 
Six-twelve 
months 
One to 
two years 
Over 
two 
years 
Flexible No 
detail 
Number 0 14 39 7 6 2 8 
% of 76 0% 18.4% 51.3% 9.2% 7.9% 2.6% 10.5% 
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Table 2 
Table 2: Prominent mechanism to define affordability 
Mechanism Extensive 
form 
Interview for 
new member 
Less extensive 
form 
No form, but 
suggestion of 
detail 
No form and 
no detail 
available. 
Number 45 5 8 5 13 
% of 76 59.2% 6.6% 10.5% 6.6% 17.1% 
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Table 3 
Table 3: Principle on which interest charged on loans for new members at credit unions 
offering loans to new members and comparison with principles at other credit unions 
Principle Variation 
simply 
between new 
loans and 
other loans 
Variation 
between 
first and 
subsequent 
loans 
Inversion 
between 
rate and 
sum 
Product 
related 
Standard Variable 
with 
ratio of 
savings 
to loan 
Insufficient 
detail 
Number 9 0 11 47 7 0 2 
% of 76 11.8% 0% 14.5% 61.8% 9.2% 0% 2.6% 
Number 0 2 24 22 32 1 8 
% of 89 0% 2.2% 27% 24.7% 36% 1.1% 9% 
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Table 4 
Table 4: Comparison between the terms for loans at credit unions who had and those who 
had not introduced loans for new members. 
Maximum interest rates 
Rate p.m. 3% 2.75% 2.5% 1.51-2% 1.01-
1.5% 
1% Under 
1% 
Number 40 3 1 23 5 4 0 
% of 76 52.6% 3.9% 1.3% 30.3% 6.6% 5.3% 0% 
Number 33 0 2 28 7 18 1 
% of 89 37.1% 0% 2.2% 31.5% 7.9% 20.2% 1.1% 
Time to make a decision  
Length Same 
day 
1-3 
working 
days 
Week Two 
weeks 
Not 
clear but 
short 
Linked to 
first 
repayment 
No 
detail 
Number 0 8 10 9 22 5 22 
% of 76 0% 10.5% 13.2% 11.8% 28.9% 6.6% 28.9% 
Number 5 9 5 18 9 0 43 
% of 89 5.6% 10.1% 5.6% 20.2% 10.1% 0% 48.3% 
Indicative maximum length of repayment period 
Length Next 
payday 
One-six 
months 
Six-twelve 
months 
One to 
two years 
Over 
two 
years 
Flexible No 
detail 
Number 0 14 39 7 6 2 8 
% of 76 0% 18.4% 51.3% 9.2% 7.9% 2.6% 10.5% 
Number 0 6 28 4 32 1 18 
% of 89 0% 6.7% 31.5% 4.5% 40% 1.1% 20.2% 
 
